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1Chicago Monetary Traditions
         by
David Laidler
(Bank of Montreal Professor)
Abstract: This paper, prepared for the forthcoming Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of
Economics (Ross Emmett and Malcolm Rutherford eds.) describes monetary economics as it
existed in four eras at the University of Chicago.  It begins with analysis, based on the Real Bills
Doctrine, developed by J. Laurence Laughlin, the first chairman of the Chicago Economics
Department, and such students as Henry Parker Willis, which had an important influence on the
original Federal Reserve Act, and then successively discusses: the inter-war “Chicago tradition”
of such economists as Jacob Viner and Henry Simons, but also encompassing Paul Douglas’s
under-consumptionism; Milton Friedman’s “Monetarism”; and New-classical economics as
pioneered by Robert E. Lucas Jr. The paper’s basic theme is that, although Chicago monetary
thought has never been quite as unique and single-minded as some of its admirers have claimed
from time to time, it did maintain a certain distinctiveness during its first three eras that has now
disappeared. 
2In popular understanding, the University of Chicago monetary tradition is inextricably linked to
the ideas of Milton Friedman, which extend well beyond that area to encompass a general belief
in the efficacy of market mechanisms as regulators of economic life, and an equally general
skepticism about the desirability of government intervention therein (Reder 1987). Chicago
“monetarism” is seen as having challenged (more or less successfully, depending on the
commentator) a previously dominant “Keynesian” consensus on these matters. Though Chicago
monetary economics can, and should, be judged on its theoretical and empirical merits, I shall
also pay some attention to its broader political connections in this essay, because such
considerations are important in locating its position in the broader history of American economic
thought.. 
The First Chicago Tradition
The history of Chicago monetary economics long antedates the outbreak of the monetarist
controversy of the 1950s. The first chairman of the Chicago economics department, James
Laurence Laughlin, was one of America’s most influential monetary economists between the
1880s and the foundation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. (Friedman 1987, Dimand
2002). Along with his student Henry Parker Willis, eventually a professor at Columbia Business
School, he continued to expound his ideas in the debates about monetary policy of the 1920s and
1930s, though. another important student, Wesley Clair Mitchell, had by then largely broken free
of his influence.
Laughlin was conservative in both his politics and his economics throughout his long life,
as his writings (eg.1885, 1903, 1933) attest. He was a staunch defender of the gold standard
during the debates about bimetallism, and his close association with the Republican Party, forged
during that debate, prevented him playing a direct role in the creation of the Federal Reserve
system, though he exerted considerable indirect influence on that process, both through the force
of his ideas, and through Willis who played a direct role as counsel to Congressman Carter
Glass’s Banking sub-committee. Here, Laughlin and Willis represented what Robert Dimand has
termed the “Lasalle Street Tradition” which sought to prevent any American Central Bank being
dominated either by the Federal Government or private interests centred on New York. The
3division of the system into twelve districts, each served by what was initially supposed to be its
own central bank, reflected this viewpoint..    
But Laughlin’s conservatism does not link him to any later Chicago monetary tradition,
because, in the monetary area, and in the first of several strokes of irony that mark that
tradition’s development, he was a leading opponent of the Quantity Theory of Money. Long after
marginalist ideas permeated micro-economics Laughlin remained a devotee of the classical cost-
of-production theory of value, and of the related idea that gold was the “natural” standard of
value. These ideas led him to treat price level variations under the gold standard as originating in
changes in the cost of production of individual goods. They also led him to oppose proposals for
countering the deflation that marked the period 1873-1896 by monetary expansion based on re-
introducing silver into the monetary system, and hence restoring bimetallism to the US monetary
system. 
For Laughlin, the latter ideas, which were supported by the progressive wing of the
Democratic Party, and notably by William Jennings Bryan, were ill-conceived and dangerous.
(Laidler 2001) There was indeed a strong inflationist element among the bimetallists, but
Laughlin rejected not just that, but the quantity theory of money upon which even responsible
bimetallists, such as Francis Walker, (ironically) of MIT, based their case. He and his fellow
defenders of gold monometallism were so successful in discrediting the quantity theory in
popular thought that Irving Fisher’s 1911 Purchasing Power of Money was written explicitly to
re-instate it as a scientifically respectable doctrine, and is best read as a rebuttal of Laughlin’s
ideas.  
   
When it came to banking, Laughlin expounded a version of what Lloyd Mints (1945), a
contributor to the inter-war Chicago tradition to be discussed below, would later call the “real
bills doctrine”. Laughlin took over from the mid-19th century British “Banking School” the view
that the banking system should grant short term credit in sufficient amounts to meet the “needs
of trade”, which were themselves conditioned by real factors. This goal would be best
accomplished by a banking system configured to provide an “elastic currency”. Neither Laughlin
(nor the Banking School before him) made a careful and consistent distinction between money
4and credit, but in practice their prescription was that a banking system should confine itself to
providing short term loans to finance inventories and goods in process in whatever amounts were
demanded, and they were sometimes unfortunately vague about the role of the rate of interest in
conditioning that demand. Such behaviour, they believed, would make the banking system a
passive agent in an economy that could otherwise be trusted to run smoothly, and prevent it from
contributing to monetary instability.  
These views, which were also held by Willis, had a considerable influence both on the
design of the Federal Reserve system, and on its policies in the 1920s and early 1930s, when, it
is now widely agreed, the Fed’s passivity permitted an ordinary cyclical downturn to get out of
hand and develop into what Friedman and Schwartz (1963) would call the Great Contraction.
Laughlin and Willis were prominent among those who took a fatalistic attitude towards the
economy’s collapse in the early 1930s, defended the Fed’s passive stance, and opposed any
policies actively designed to promote recovery. By that time, however, such ideas were no
longer represented among active members of the Chicago department.
The Inter-war Chicago Tradition
No proposition is more closely associated with Friedman’s monetary economics than that the
Federal Reserve system was largely responsible for the severity of the Great Contraction, and
Lloyd Mints had developed a version of this argument as early as (1948). The contrast between
early Chicago monetary economics as represented by Laughlin, and Friedman’s version could,
therefore, hardly be starker.  Friedman argued (1956, 1974), that even in the early 1930s,
Chicago was distinct in being already the home of a body of ideas, built around the quantity
theory of money, that took an optimistic view of what monetary policy could have achieved in
fighting the Contraction. And, he claimed, the strength of the intellectual tradition in question
had rendered Chicago essentially immune to the influence of Keynes’s ideas after 1936, and
hence had laid the intellectual basis for his own work of the 1950s and 1960s. 
   Now in the economic thought of the inter-war United States, the quantity theory of
money is most closely associated with Irving Fisher, whose academic home was (another irony)
Yale, not Chicago; but to understand just what is right and what is wrong with Friedman’s
5account of the Chicago monetary tradition during the Great Contraction, it must first be
appreciated that the debates of that time were considerably more than a simple matter of
“quantity theory versus real-bills doctrine” with Fisher and his followers on one side and
Laughlin and his heirs on the other. In the 1920s, Fisher was beginning to display some of that
intellectual rigidity that would in due course earn him the reputation of a monetary crank, and he
spent a good deal of time campaigning, first for a monetary policy based upon his “compensated
dollar” scheme, and then, less specifically, for the imposition by law of a price-level stability
mandate on the Federal Reserve system. 
Fisher’s extremism left open a considerable middle ground in the debate between him
and the Real Bills camp that was occupied by a variety of proponents of what was then called
“credit control”, the deployment by the Fed. of discretionary monetary policy to help stabilize
cyclical fluctuations (Mehrling, 1998). These middle ground ideas were heavily influenced by
the British economists Ralph Hawtrey (eg. 1919) and the Keynes of the (1923) Tract on
Monetary Reform.  Prominent, though by no means alone, among their exponents was Allyn
Young, who had been Frank H. Knight’s Ph.D. supervisor at Cornell. Young was at Harvard in
the 1920s, and, prior to his departure for the London School of Economics in 1927, an occasional
advisor to Governor Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He was,
however, evidently well known and admired at Chicago, and not just by Knight. The influenza
which was to cause his premature death in 1929 was in fact contracted during a visit to the
University to discuss and decline an offer of the chairmanship of the economics department
(Blitch 1996). 
A good part of the Chicago monetary tradition of the interwar years is properly located 
in the abovementioned middle ground. Before the onset of the Contraction it offered cautious
support for the deployment of discretionary monetary policy, and more urgent support thereafter.
Charles Oliver Hardy, a lecturer at Chicago between 1918 and 1922, and later closely associated
with the Brookings Institution, and Jacob Viner, at Chicago from 1919 until 1946, come to mind
here as cautious proponents of monetary stabilisation policies. But the heretical under-
consumptionism of William Truffant Foster and Wadill Catchings was also vigorously
represented in the Chicago department by Paul Douglas, better remembered nowadays for his
6work in labour economics and his later accomplishments as a US Senator, who had joined the
Department in 1920, and would remain an active member until his entry into politics in the late
1930s. At the other end of the political spectrum, Henry Simons who joined the Department in
1927, combined the quantity theory with a rule-based approach to monetary policy, similar in
many essentials to Fisher’s, and with a broader commitment to laissez-faire, while mention
should also be made of Aaron Director and Lloyd Mints, who came to share his views. 
Director, later Friedman’s brother-in-law, initially joined the Department to work with
Douglas, and in 1931 produced with him a rather conventional survey volume on The Problem of
Unemployment (in which Douglas’s under-consumptionism was temporarily replaced by
monetary analysis that owed a good deal Keynes’s Tract). Soon afterwards, however, Director
became, along with his sister Rose Director and Simons, a leading member of the conservative
group that gathered around Frank Knight. At this time, relations between the Knight and Douglas
were so bad that they communicated only in writing, and Douglas, having failed to prevent
Simons obtaining tenure, was rewarded by Director’s banishment to the Chicago Law School.
Mints wrote nothing of interest before 1945 but nevertheless taught a brand of monetary
economics throughout the 1930s and into the early 1950s that seems to have been heavily
influenced by the ideas of Simons and owed essentially nothing to the Keynes of the General
Theory (See Mints 1946, 1948).
Evidently, then, monetary economics at Chicago was anything but scientifically or
politically homogeneous during the Great Contraction, but the economic problems of the time
meant that economists with very different understandings of how the economy functioned, and
of very different political persuasions too, could sometimes agree about policy, and so it was at
Chicago for a while. In the early 1930s it was natural for an under-consumptionist of Douglas’s
stripe to support with renewed vigour the continuous fiscal and monetary expansion that he had
been recommending even during the boom of the 1920s. And it was equally natural for a
quantity theorist such as Viner (1932,1933) to deplore the influence of the real bills doctrine on
Fed. Policy and to join Simons and others among his colleagues in supporting immediate
monetary expansion as a palliative for the contraction, though Viner was troubled  that such
policies might require the US to abandon the gold standard, of which he was a supporter. 
7As banking problems in the United States became more and more acute in 1932-33, it
was also natural to look for ways of ensuring that monetary expansion could in fact be
engineered. and, it is not surprising that  “fiscal inflationism”, the use of money financed budget
deficits to bring about monetary expansion, should find support from a group that had Douglas at
one theoretical and political extreme and Simons at the other, and included Viner for a while too.
Nor was it surprising that a proposal for backing demand deposits with a 100 per cent reserve
requirement in order to give the authorities firm control over the behaviour of the money supply,
and to prevent any future collapses of the market for bank credit generating monetary
contractions, - the central feature of A. G. Hart (1935) would term the “Chicago Plan for
Banking Reform” - would also emerge from and find support among this diverse group.
Friedman’s story, recently revived by Tavlas (1998), of a unique “Chicago Tradition”,
based on the quantity theory, that advocated tackling the Depression by fiscal and monetary
expansion long before the ideas of Keynes began to sweep the United States from a beach-head
established at Harvard in 1936, is nevertheless over-simple. To begin with, even the policy
proposals emanating from Chicago itself were not uniquely related to the quantity theory of
money. Douglas’s version of them was, as we have seen, based not on the quantity theory, but on
an under-consumptionist theory. By 1933, furthermore, he was also beginning to cite Keynes’
multiplier analysis as set out in The Means to Prosperity (1933) in support of his policy
recommendations. More generally, monetary explanations of the contraction, proposals for
monetary expansion in general, and fiscal inflationism and 100 per cent reserve requirements in
particular were neither unique to Chicago economists, nor originated among them (See, inter
alia. Reeve (1943), Humphrey (1971), Phillips (1995), and Laidler, (1999, Chs. 8 and 9). Such
ideas are to be found independently and more or less fully articulated in the writings of a number
of non-Chicagoans in the early 1930s,  in some cases before they appear in Chicago sources.
This is not to deny that such ideas were discussed and promoted at Chicago. Over and
above the contributions made by members of the Chicago department of economics, two
conferences held there in 1931 and 1932 under the auspices of the Harris Foundation, also attest
to this.(Wright (ed.) 1931, 1932) At the first of these, Keynes himself spoke, and following his
recently published Treatise on Money, proposed  a monetary cure for the gathering down-turn,
8based on driving down the long rate of interest. According to Davis (1971) he disappointed his
audience, Chicagoans and others alike, by his timid attitude towards expansionary fiscal policy.
From the second conference, there emerged a nowadays well known petition to President Hoover
advocating vigorous monetary and fiscal expansion, signed by 12 members of the Chicago
Department (though not by Douglas), but also by 12 non-Chicagoans, among whom were Irving
Fisher, Alvin Hansen (Minnesota), Carl Snyder (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and  John
H. Williams (Harvard)    
                  
The picture that emerges from all this is not of Chicago as a unique institution where
ideas that had difficulty maintaining more than a foothold elsewhere were developed and
promoted during the 1930s, but rather as a department that was one important and vigorous
participant in a much more widespread tradition in monetary economics, many (but not all) of
whose adherents deployed the quantity theory of money in a critique of economic policies based
on the real bills doctrine, and in proposals to supplant those policies with vigorous monetary and
fiscal expansion.
 To the extent that Chicago made a unique contribution to this tradition, it was the
approach to economic policy that we associate with the writings of Henry Simons, but to which
Aaron Director almost surely significantly contributed as well, not to mention Lloyd Mints. Most
advocates of a monetary explanation of the Great contraction, fiscal inflationism and one
hundred percent money combined these ideas with support for the more general policy activism
of the New Deal - Lauchlin Currie, whom Viner took with him to Washington from Harvard in
1934, is a case in point - but these Chicago economists linked them instead with Fisher’s case for
rule guided monetary policy and made the resulting package a central component of what
Simons in (1934) termed A Positive Program for Laissez-faire.  Within the context of the
Chicago Department, it is natural to contrast this program with Paul Douglas’s democratic
socialist agenda, as set out in his (1932) The Coming of a New Party, but, including as it did
proposals for vigorous anti-trust policies, and serious income re-distribution, Simon’s program
was (another irony) in some ways closer to the progressive populism against which Laughlin had
fought in the 1890s, than to the conservative agenda associated with Chicago from the 1950s
onwards. 
9The indisputable continuity between the specifically monetary component of Simons’
program and Friedman’s later work is not, however, the result of Chicago’s being free of
Keynesian economics in the interim. Chicago reviewers of the General Theory, who included
Viner, Knight and Simons were critical of the book, the latter two being downright hostile, and
Knight does seem to have managed to prevent Chicago awarding Keynes an honorary degree in
1941. Beginning in the 1940s, Chicago was nevertheless home to such Keynesians such as Oscar
Lange, Jacob Marshak, and Lloyd Metzler, not to mention the staff of the Cowles Commission,
and to graduate students such as Don Patinkin whose work provided a key foundation of what
came to be called the Neoclassical Synthesis (On all this see, Patinkin1981). This Keynesian
influence would not be dominant for long, but that too was not because of the resilience of any
local tradition. After Simons untimely death in 1946, only Lloyd Mints remained at Chicago to
teach the monetary ideas of the mid-1930s, and it is notable, that, among the accomplishments
with which George Stigler (1988) credits Friedman after his arrival at Chicago in 1946, is the
revival there of  “the study of monetary economics, which had become moribund”.(p.151)            
 
Friedman and the Monetarist Tradition
Friedman had been a graduate student at Chicago for a while in the 1930s, but the links between
his work and that of Simons are not straightforward. His Ph.D was from Columbia, and his
empiricism, not to mention his frequently displayed preference for the NBER techniques of
Arthur Burns and Wesley Clair Mitchell over the more conventional econometric methods of the
Cowles Commission, also display a Columbia influence. Furthermore, Friedman’s early
macroeconomic work was conventionally Keynesian (in the tradition of the inflationary gap
analysis of Keynes 1940) and paid little explicit attention to the role of money.  
Before the early 1950s, Friedman was, in any event, mainly visible as a statistician and
micro-theorist with strong mathematical skills. It was his (1953) essay “On the Methodology of
Positive Economics”, which defended empirical relevance of the theory of the profit-maximising 
firm, and particularly its perfectly competitive version, on the basis of its capacity to make useful
predictions (an approach influenced by contacts made with Karl Popper through the Mont
Pelerin Society - see Friedman and Friedman, 1999) and his (1956) “The Quantity Theory of
Money - a Restatement” that established him as a critic of the then dominant economic
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orthodoxy that American economics had inherited from the late 1930s. This orthodoxy viewed
the economy as dominated by large firms, whose administered prices had more to do with the
exercise of monopoly power than the efficient allocation of resources, and hence fit objects for
regulation, and it put its faith in fiscal rather than monetary tools for activist macro-stabilisation,
Friedman “restated” the quantity theory as a theory of the demand for money that bore a 
strong resemblance to Keynes’s (1936) version of liquidity preference theory, albeit without the
“liquidity trap”, which was then a prominent feature of textbook expositions of the latter, but that
hardly made his work “Keynesian”. Keynes’s theory had roots of its own in the work of
Marshall, Pigou and Lavington, who had developed a version of the quantity theory based on the
interaction of the stock supply and demand for money (in contrast to Fisher’s more traditional
money times velocity flow approach), and this approach had also influenced the middle ground
of American monetary economics discussed earlier, where much earlier Chicago work had been
located
. 
Even though, before Friedman, the quantity theory had been understood to deal with the
influence of the quantity of money on prices and not just the demand for money, it is a necessary
condition for such influence to be systematic and predictable that the demand for money be a
stable function of but a few arguments, and this was the central proposition of his essay.
Furthermore, empirical studies of the influence of money on inflation played a central role in the
work of his colleagues and students (in addition to Friedman 1956, see also, for example,
Meiselman (ed.) 1970), so, overall, Friedman was surely right to claim a  place for his work in a
quantity theory based tradition..
The claim that a particular macroeconomic relationship was both simple and empirically
stable, was not new in 1956. Keynes had made it on behalf of the consumption function twenty
years earlier, and by the 1950s, a stable marginal propensity to save out of current income, and
hence a stable multiplier, was seen as the sine qua non for successful fiscal policy. Friedman’s
1957 Theory of the Consumption Function, (for which he received his Nobel Prize) showed that
the, by then numerous and well known, anomalies in observed income consumption relationships
could be resolved by postulating that consumption (of non-durable goods) was a stable function
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of permanent income, so that saving would be an unstable sum of the fraction of permanent
income saved and transitory fluctuations around it. Thus, Friedman’s work of the 1950s replaced
a supposedly empirically stable savings function with a stable demand for money function,
thereby undermining conventional policy wisdom which emphasised the efficacy of fiscal rather
than monetary tools. And to this he added a keen appreciation of the possibility that policy in
general, but monetary policy in particular, worked with long and variable time lags, that made its
use for active stabilisation purposes problematic. 
By (1959), then, Friedman was suggesting that monetary policy be used to create a
background of macroeconomic stability by being tied down to a constant rate of growth for the
money supply, and suggesting that, in such a regime, there was no place for stabilisation by
fiscal means. Small wonder that he recognised the relationship between his views and those
espoused by Henry Simons two decades earlier, (though Simons (1936) had favoured a price
stability rule) and small wonder too that, with the links between his policy proposals and a
conservative political agenda being so evident, his work was greeted with skepticism and
sometime outright ridicule in more orthodox circles. 
But, it is important to note, Friedman’s policy conclusions followed from well specified
economic theory. And he soon extended the latter by showing (1968) that then widely held
beliefs, that inflation and unemployment varied inversely with each other along a Phillips curve
that might be exploited by policy makers, rested on the hidden postulate that economic agents
suffered from permanent money illusion. Friedman also developed a considerable body of
empirical evidence, not least that presented in Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) Monetary
History of the United States,  that argued for an essentially monetary explanation of the cycle in
general and the Great Contraction of 1929-33 in particular. In the latter case, his arguments
followed lines that a number of middle ground American economists of the early 1930s had
adopted at the time. Politically unpalatable or not, then, the economics profession in due course
had to take Friedman’s views seriously. Because they involved economics that had political
implications, rather than economics distorted by preconceived ideology, they invited theoretical
and empirical criticism, and ultimately received it, in the course of the so-called “monetarist
controversy”.    
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The style of monetary thought that Friedman had established at Chicago by about 1970
had antecedents, of course. In addition to Simons, his analysis of money in the Great Contraction
had important predecessors such as Clark Warburton (See 1966) and Lauchlin Currie (1934)
(whom he did not acknowledge till much later). And Friedman had ideas in common with
economists working elsewhere too.  Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, first at UCLA, and later at
Ohio State, Rochester and Carnegie-Mellon Universities respectively, had begun to publish the
first of their own significant contributions (surveyed retrospectively in 1993) to the development
of  “monetarism” in the early 1960s; Franco Modigliani’s life cycle model of consumption was
close to Friedman’s; A. W. Phillips had analysed the problems raised by lags in the effect of
policy;  while Edmund Phelps’ debunking of the idea of a long-run inflation unemployment
trade-off had even appeared a little earlier than Friedman’s. 
Moreover, Friedman was anything but a lone wolf in his own university. His theoretical
and policy ideas were buttressed by a series of empirical studies, mainly carried out by students,
many of whom would in due course go on to make considerable reputations of their own. It was
also at about this time, specifically in 1960, that the formidable Harry Johnson was appointed to
Chicago as a “Keynesian” counterweight to Friedman, and undertook the task of ensuring that
students were exposed to the whole literature of monetary economics, and not just Chicago’s
contribution to it. 
But, when all is said and done, the Chicago monetary tradition of the late1960s was more
homogeneous, more distinctive, and more the product of the ideas and energy of one man than
anything that had been seen in the inter-war years. And yet at that time it was also a tradition in
search of an important policy problem (Johnson 1971) The quantity theory was primarily a
theory of price level behaviour. Friedman and his associates had demonstrated its relevance to
important inflationary episodes of the past, and to Latin America too, where Arnold Harberger’s
(1963) paper on inflation in Chile made an important contribution to the “monetarist” side of the
highly ideologically charged “monetarist-structuralist” debate that was then in progress. And
even if monetary factors had played a major role in US monetary history, not least the 1930s, the
relevance of all this to current US and European experience was not quite clear, not least
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because, no matter what theory said, the latter economies did at that time seem to be
characterised by an inflation-unemployment trade-off.
All this changed in the 1970s as the inflation which, with hindsight can be seen to have
begun developing from the early 1960s onwards, took hold, of not just the United States but the
whole Western World. The Chicago monetary tradition not only had its problem, but it  was
simultaneously presented with extra empirical support as the inflation-unemployment trade-off
vanished. At this time too, it went through an further important theoretical extension, as the idea
of a stable demand for money function was used by Harry Johnson, Robert Mundell (appointed
to Chicago in 1964) and their students, as the foundation of what came to be known as the
“monetary approach” to balance of payments and exchange rate analysis.(See, for example,
Frenkel and Johnson (eds.) 1976)
 
By the end of the 1970s, “monetarism” had also found strong political supporters, notably
among what would become the Reagan Administration in the United States and the Thatcher
Government in the United Kingdom, though here, it should be noted that the first efforts to bring
inflation down by way of monetary contraction started, albeit tentatively, in both countries
before the accession of either to office. But it was under them that a monetary cure for inflation
was vigorously applied, alongside a more general shift to laissez-faire economic policies. As a
result, the political association between the Chicago monetary tradition and conservative politics,
which had already received an unfortunate boost in Chile where, under the Pinochet regime, such
policies had already become associated with military dictatorship, became firmly cemented in
public perceptions.   
After Monetarism
There is not space here to discuss why the quantity theory of money, which had been associated
with progressive politics when the University of Chicago was founded, had migrated to the right
by the late 1970s. (See Laidler 2001). It is, however, important to the story of monetary
economics at that University to note that problems with definition and measurement of money,
long the Achilles heel of that doctrine, reasserted their significance with a vengeance at that
time. Financial innovations, some but not all of which were themselves responses to inflation,
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began to undermine the empirical stability of the demand for money function. On the policy
front, this contributed to the difficulties that central banks encountered in ensuring a smooth end
to inflation, and within academic monetary economics it contributed to an intellectual vacuum
which was soon to be filled, not least at the University of Chicago, by  New-classical economics. 
Tobin’s (1981) characterisation of it as “Monetarism Mark 2,” notwithstanding, the latter
doctrine’s connection to Chicago was not as strong as that of Monetarism Mark 1. Three of its
leading proponents  in its early days, Robert E. Lucas Jr. Thomas Sargent and Robert J. Barro,
held faculty positions at Chicago, but the latter two, both Harvard Ph.Ds did not settle there. And
while Lucas and Neil Wallace were Chicago graduates, neither had written Ph.D. theses on 
monetary topics, while Lucas’s earliest work on rational expectations and the cycle was done at
Carnegie Mellon University, where he was certainly influenced by Allan Meltzer. 
It is too early to assess the place of New classical economics in the history of monetary
economics. In its earliest form, which had the Lucas (eg. 1972) Sargent and Wallace (eg. 1976)
“money supply surprise” model of the cycle as its centrepiece, it had seemed to have a great deal 
in common with Friedman’s work: hence the  “Monetarism Mark 2" label. It attributed economic
fluctuations to monetary shocks, denied the existence of a long-run inflation unemployment
trade-off, and in ruling out as a theoretical, rather than merely empirical, matter, the
effectiveness of discretionary stabilization policy, it affirmed its conservative political links. But
crucially, the model’s logical structure required that prices move simultaneously with, or even
ahead of quantities after a monetary shock, and this was quite contrary to one of the most basic
stylised facts of the cycle that Friedman had long stressed. 
In the face of the money supply surprise model’s inevitable empirical failure, New-
classical economists clung not to their model’s monetarist characteristics, but to the market-
clearing and rational expectations postulates, the two features that they had added to Friedman’s
analysis, and took them in a number of directions - into real business cycle theory, monetary
models based on Samuelson’s over-lapping generations model of money, models of the origins
of money, and even into endogenous growth theory. And at the same time, so called “New-
Keynesian economics”, which emphasises the role of market failures and nominal stickiness in
15
the monetary economy began to look a lot like the “old monetarist economics”of Friedman and
Brunner and Meltzer. In short, though old debates in monetary economics carry on in new forms,
and economists based at Chicago still contribute to them, it is hard indeed to identify a
distinctively “Chicago Tradition” within the literature they are generating.
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